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The decommodified
se cu rity ra tio:
A tool for as sess ing
Eu ro pean so cial pro tec tion
sys tems
Georges Menahem
Director of research at CNRS-CEPN, Université Paris 13,
and IRDES
With a view to better assessment of the roles played
by social security and social policy in determining
well-being, this article introduces the ”decommodified
security ratio“ (DSR), an instrument for evaluating
an important duty of the social State, namely to maintain
and improve people’s economic security. To that end
we describe the conventions for its use, analyse its main
components in 20 European countries in 2002 and
simulate the changes in it produced by ten variations
in those components. From an analysis of the sensitivities
of economic security we then demonstrate three different
rationales.
What will to mor row’s so cial pro tec tion look like? What tools can as sistus in shap ing it? These ques tions come to mind when we read the an a -
lyt i cal ar ti cle by Chantal Euzéby (2004) en ti tled ”Re think ing so cial se cu rity
in the Eu ro pean Un ion: Ex tend ing fun da men tal uni ver sal rights”. The au -
thor stresses the im por tance of the so cial shifts which the coun tries of Eu -
rope are cur rently ex pe ri enc ing: chang ing pat terns of work, the  phenom -
enon she calls the ”break down in the wage struc ture“, de vel op ments  asso -
ciated with un em ploy ment, pre car i ous em ploy ment and ex clu sion, fam ily
in sta bil ity and count less other fac tors which jeop ar dize the in di vid ual’s
 security. She com pares this alarm ing pic ture with more the o ret i cal sce nar -
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My thanks are due to two anon y mous ref er ees and to Pro fes sor Jean Gadrey for kindly read ing 
through this text and for their valu able com ments, which prompted me to make sig nif i cant im -
prove ments to my ini tial draft. Any re main ing er rors and in ad e qua cies are, of course, en tirely
my own.
ios stress ing the im por tance of con cern for se cu rity: on one hand what she
calls the ”postwelfarist prin ci ples of jus tice as un der stood by John Rawls
and Amartya Sen” and, on the other hand, quo ta tions from the ILO’s 1944
Dec la ra tion of Phil a del phia and Articles 22 and 25 of the 1948 Uni ver sal
Dec la ra tion of Hu man Rights emphasizing the need for the individ ual
within a so ci ety to have ”eco nomic se cu rity”, ”so cial se cu rity” and, very
spe cif i cally (Ar ti cle 25), ”security in the event of un em ploy ment, sick ness,
dis abil ity, wid ow hood, old age or other lack of live li hood in circumstances
be yond his con trol”.
The as sump tions be hind her pa per are in es cap able if we are to con sider
in greater depth the fun da men tal na ture of the need for se cu rity, and this
prompts us to think about the best ways of “shap ing so cial se cu rity”. In or -
der both to de fine its broad prin ci ples and make ad just ments to its meth ods
of im ple men ta tion, we need tools: the o ret i cal tools — and Euzéby’s pro pos -
als are es sen tially that — but po lit i cal tools as well, of course; plus tools of a
more sta tis ti cal na ture, to en able us to as sess whether the means used are
ad equate to the ends pur sued, one of those es sen tial ends be ing the se cu rity
of the individ ual. 
Prog ress to wards this lat ter end has al ready been greatly fur thered by
the work of the In ter na tional La bour Office. In par tic u lar, the pro gramme of 
re search spear headed by Stand ing (2002) with the aim of build ing a world
sys tem of “Peo ple’s Se cu rity Sur veys” is ex tremely valu able. This am bi -
tious work en ables a num ber of in dexes of se cu rity to be de vised — se cu rity
of in come, of skill re pro duc tion, job, em ploy ment, un ion rep re sen ta tion
and so on — and aims to take ac count of the many di men sions of work ing
life through out the world.
The thrust of the pres ent ar ti cle is less am bi tious in that it con fines it self
es sen tially to es ti mat ing the out comes of so cial pro tec tion as de liv ered to
cit i zens un der so cial se cu rity sys tems in Eu rope. We de fine the eco nomic
 security of the individ ual as that which safe guards the individ ual against the
risk of pov erty due to lack or loss of in come or an in ad e quate in come. Bear -
ing in mind the ap proach con cep tu al ized by Esping-Andersen (1990) in
 defining the role of the con sti tu tional State in re la tion to the mar ket, we
 distinguish two types of security as so ci ated with two types of re sources:
”commodified” se cu rity de rives from ”commodified” in come be cause this
arises from com mer cial ex changes per formed ei ther in la bour mar kets,
which fix the terms of paid em ploy ment, or in mar kets in goods and ser -
vices which de ter mine in comes from self-em ploy ment or from prop erty;
while ”decommodified” se cu rity de rives from ”decommodified” in come,
so called be cause it is in de pend ent of mar kets and arises ei ther from so cial
ben efit entitlements or from grants and as sis tance paid by vir tue of a per -
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son’s place of res i dence or sit u a tion of in ad e quate means.1 Decommodified
se cu rity thus en com passes both so cial se cu rity per se and se cu rity in the
form of ben efits, as sis tance and so cial wel fare de liv ered to the needy by lo -
cal gov ern ment and wel fare or ga ni za tions.2
To para phrase word ing used in the sub stan tial work L’Etat so cial by
Merrien et al. (2004), ”the em blem atic face of the so cial State” con sists of the
full range of so cial entitlements, the guar an tee of these which state back ing
pro vides, and the ac tions which the State takes in the name of na tional sol i -
dar ity. Thus, the pres ent ar ti cle takes as its start ing point the links be tween
eco nomic se cu rity and de vel op ment of the role of the so cial State, in pro pos -
ing a tool for eval u at ing eco nomic se cu rity as pro vided by so cial pro tec tion
sys tems. This tool is the ”decommodified se cu rity ra tio”. Af ter a brief his -
tor i cal re view of the in ter ac tion be tween so cial State and mar ket forces, we
pres ent three in di ca tors which seek to mea sure eco nomic se cu rity and the
”decommodification” of peo ple’s entitlements: Esping-Andersen’s score, a
Ca na dian in dex of se cu rity and the ”decommodified se cu rity ra tio”. Fea -
tures of this third in di ca tor are il lus trated in Ta ble 1, which shows the com -
po nents of se cu rity for a range of Eu ro pean so cial States. An es ti mate is then 
made of the mul ti ple ways in which the decommodified se cu rity ra tio is
sen si tive to so cial pol icy.
Social construction of economic security
and principles for assessing it
Now a days, in most Eu ro pean coun tries, most of the pop u la tion is pro tected 
against the risk of pov erty. But be cause this eco nomic se cu rity is rel a tive,
not to tal, it needs to be as sessed. This sit u a tion is the re sult of a lengthy pro -
cess of so cial con struc tion. The his tory of suc ces sive ini tia tives by the so cial
State can be traced through the man i fes ta tions of ma te rial se cu rity en joyed
by the pub lic, or rather their lack of it (Castel, 2003). Thus, if we look back to
the sev en teenth cen tury and Hobbes’ Le vi a than of 1651, a sem i nal work by
one of the ear li est think ers of the mod ern age, in na ture ”Man is a wolf to
Man” and there is no se cu rity at all. Ac cord ing to Hobbes, in or der to pro -
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1.  We dis re gard in this arti cle eco nomic secu rity which pro tects against cer tain risks as men -
tioned by Beck (1986) in his Risikogesellschaft and related to nat u ral or indus trial disas ters or the
even tu al ity of ter ror ist attack, civil dis tur bance, crime or war, risks which fall within the prov -
ince of civil soci ety.
2.  Refer ring to the def i ni tion of social pro tec tion pro posed by Polanyi (1944) which rec og nizes
three main meth ods of attri bu tion (pri vate insur ance, fam ily sol i dar ity, and state and social
redis tri bu tion) as a way of pro tect ing work ers against the effects of mar ket forces, we should
point out that our approach of decommodified secu rity con cerns only the third method of
social pro tec tion as defined by this author.
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Ta ble 1. The four com po nents of the decommodified se cu rity ra tio 
in 20 Eu ro pean coun tries in 2000 (%)
Eco nomic 
in se cu rity
in dex (EII)
Re place-
ment 
in come 
(re tire ment
pen sion, 
un em ploy -
ment)
Reimbur-
sement 
(sick ness,
dis abil ity)
Fam ily
(hous ing, 
ex clu sion)
DSR
Coun tries of the North
Nor way  –6.0 10.2 17.9 5.8 27.9
Swe den  –6.6 14.2 14.7 5.5 27.8
Neth er lands  –6.6 15.4 14.7 4.2 27.7
Den mark  –6.6 12.5 11.4 7.8 25.1
Fin land  –6.6 12.2 11.5 5.1 22.2
In ter me di ate coun tries 
Aus tria  –7.5 15.1 10.3 4.1 22.0
France  –7.2 13.0  9.4 4.0 19.3
Ger many  –9.0 13.5 10.1 4.0 18.5
Czech Re pub lic  –4.8  9.9 10.0 2.7 17.8
Bel gium  –8.4 13.1  8.5 2.8 16.1
United King dom –10.8 10.8  9.4 3.7 13.1
Coun tries of the South
Por tu gal –12.0 11.1 10.0 2.0 11.1
It aly –11.4 12.7  7.0 1.0  9.3
Greece –12.3 11.2  6.4 2.5  7.8
Spain –11.4  9.2  6.4 0.7  4.9
Cen tral and east ern Eu ro pean 
coun tries
Po land –10.2  9.9  5.6 0.9  6.1
Lat via  –9.6  8.5  4.3 1.8  5.1
Slovakia –12.6  7.1  7.5 2.6  4.6
Es to nia –10.8  6.5  6.1 2.3  4.0
Lith u a nia –10.2  6.2  5.2 1.6  2.9
Source: Eurostat, data avail able in Au gust 2006.
tect one self against this ab sence of se cu rity, born nec es sar ily of hu man be -
ings liv ing to gether in so ci ety, it was nec es sary to de velop a strong State
which would con fer pro tec tion and guar an tee se cu rity. The same view was
voiced at the same time by Locke (1690) who held that the prime duty of
the lib eral State was to pro tect prop erty, which pro vided se cu rity for the
individ ual. Castel (2003) says à propos of this that, prior to Saint Just and
Robespierre, pri vate prop erty was the cor ner stone of se cu rity for the cit i -
zenry, to be de fended by the Re pub lic they were build ing. This ini tial fea -
ture of con sti tu tional States, whereby se cu rity was tied to prop erty, per sists
to day in the struc ture of most in dus tri al ized States‘ leg is la tion, though the
eco nomic bases which made this nec es sary are no lon ger as pow er ful.
The State as guarantor of means
and decommodified security
In the course of the past two cen tu ries, this duty of the so cial State as a guar -
an tor of se cu rity broadly evolved as a coun ter weight to pres sures which
threaten the struc ture of the mar ket, even though the ad vent of wage em -
ploy ment rad i cally al tered the bases of se cu rity by ru in ing a large pro por -
tion of small com mer cial busi nesses in the in dus tri al ized world. As so cial
ad vances added guar an tees against the risks of oc cu pa tional ac ci dent, then
oc cu pa tional dis ease, re tire ment and un em ploy ment, the sta tus of the em -
ployee came to be as so ci ated with more and more types of se cu rity. Thus,
in Bis marck’s Ger many, and then in France and the United King dom, the
ear li est so cial pro tec tion in sti tu tions grad u ally con sol i dated these par tial
se cu ri ties, com bin ing them into so cial se cu rity entitlements un der writ ten
by the State and then es tab lish ing ”em ploy ment” as a rec og nized sta tus in
law. When co ali tions came to power, un der pinned by the trade un ions in
so cial dem o cratic gov ern ments in north ern Eu rope, fea tures of a wage-
based so ci ety evolved in which the sta tus of em ploy ment con ferred life long
se cu ri ties. While in re cent de cades the de reg u la tion of money mar kets and
more frag ile terms of em ploy ment have placed many of the safe guards
 associated with paid em ploy ment in jeop ardy, nev er the less the so cial State
con tin ues to pro vide most of the so cial guar an tees for peo ple in the de vel -
oped coun tries. Vi tal among the forms of pro tec tion which the so cial State
has a duty to guar an tee is eco nomic se cu rity, which pro tects against the risk 
of an in ad e quate in come.
One of the prime in se cu ri ties which peo ple ex pe ri ence stems from vari a -
tions in their in come and other fi nan cial means. The in sta bil ity of com mer -
cial ac tiv i ties and the re sources they gen er ate, plus the ran dom events of
 everyday liv ing, fre quently en dan ger peo ple’s abil ity to feed, house and
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clothe them selves rou tinely and to meet their fun da men tal needs. In or der
to es cape the risks of pov erty, they must be pro tected by so cial se cu rity sys -
tems and guar an tees of as sis tance from the State. These are all the more
valu able in that they are un con di tional and not de pend ent on the whims of
the mar ket or the eco nomic cli mate. To this ex tent they are ”decom mo -
dified”— to bor row the idea of Polanyi (1944) as de vel oped and adapted to
the new fea tures of the so cial State in the writings of the Swedish sociologist
Esping-Andersen (1990).
This au thor, seek ing in his book The three worlds of wel fare cap i tal ism to
clas sify and in ter pret the pro fu sion of so cial pro tec tion sys tems, cen tred his
ana lysis of mod ern States on the con cept of ”decommodification”. He de -
fined this idea as fol lows: ”Decommodification oc curs when a ser vice is
ren dered as a mat ter of right and when a per son can main tain a live li hood
with out re li ance on the mar ket” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 22). This in de -
pend ence clearly dis tin guishes means which are ”decommodified” in this
way from the gen eral case of sub jec tion to mar ket forces, which he de -
scribed as fol lows: ”When, how ever, la bor power also be came a com mod -
ity, peo ple’s rights to sur vive out side the mar ket are at stake. It is this which
con sti tutes the sin gle most conflictual is sue in so cial pol icy . . . Wel fare,
if not sur vival, came to de pend on the will ing ness of some one to hire one’s
la bor power” (pp. 35-36). The main thing here is to stress how this con cept
cre ates a clear dis tinc tion be tween commodified se cu ri ties, ruled by the
 vicissitudes of the mar ket and em ploy ers’ de ci sions, and decommodified
se cu ri ties which, for their part, are con trolled by the State and the pub lic
 authorities. Look ing at the work of Orloff (1993) and Lewis (1992) which
 examines how far decommodification changes gen der re la tion ships, we see 
that decommodified se cu ri ties are also ”fam ily-neu tral” and en able women 
to be less de pend ent on sup port from their fam i lies or part ners, ow ing to the 
ex is tence of sep a rate ac counts and individ ual entitlements for women. This
ana lysis could be made more com plex still if we in tro duced other so cial
play ers, as Merrien et al. (2004, chap. 4, pp. 37-43) en cour age us to do. The
lat ter makes one won der if ”decommodified” means and se cu rity are not
be com ing so cial com mod i ties ap pro pri ated by the State, trade un ions and
employers’ organizations as part of social compromises closely dictated by
the history and specific situations of each country.
Two evaluations of decommodified security
The de vel op ment of nu mer ous pub lic bod ies help ing to ”decommodify” se -
cu rity makes it in creas ingly valu able to have con cepts and sta tis ti cal tools
which en able us to as sess the con se quences of so cial pol icy as it af fects peo -
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ple’s se cu rity or lack of it. To ob tain a more de tailed typology and il lus trate
its rel e vance, Esping-Andersen (1990) used a sta tis ti cal tool which he called
a ”decommodification in dex“. This was de vised pri mar ily as part of a the o -
ret i cal ana lysis to dis tin guish clearly be tween three groups of coun tries,
and it dem on strated that the typology used for so cial pro tec tion sys tems
was sound. Can it be ap plied for pur poses other than those orig i nally in -
tended? It ag gre gates both qual i ta tive and quan ti ta tive vari ables for ”sets of 
di men sions” which are very dif fer ent and per tain to three very dif fer ent
 areas.3 But as we do not know the con ven tions used to cal cu late the three
scores of which the in dex is the mean, we can not re pro duce it and test it on
other dates or coun tries. Nor, there fore, can it be used to sim u late the ef fects
of so cial pol icy changes on peo ple’s per cep tions of their se cu rity or well-
 being.
An other at tempt orig i nated in the work of two Ca na dian re search work -
ers who de vised an “in dex of eco nomic well-be ing”, which es sen tially seeks 
to  show  that  per  ca pita  GDP  is  a  not  a  good  in di ca tor  of  eco nomic well- 
be ing (Osberg and Sharpe, 2002). The prin ci ple is to take the av er age of four
sum mary in di ca tors: the first mea sures con sump tion flows in the broad
sense; the sec ond com bines con sid er ations of eco nomic and hu man ”wealth 
stocks” and tries to take ac count of en vi ron men tal dam age; the third com -
bines sum mary in di ca tors of in equal i ties with in di ces of rel a tive eco nomic
pov erty; the fourth eval u ates four types of eco nomic in se cu rity re lated to
job loss and un em ploy ment, ill ness, old age and fam ily break-up.
To mea sure in se cu rity these au thors chose to eval u ate in di vid u als’ sub -
jec tive risk of anx i ety as a re sult of four sit u a tions whose av er age cost to the
individ uals con cerned was roughly cal cu la ble. This re quired them to for -
mu late a num ber of ap prox i ma tions and an eco nomic hy poth e sis which
they ex pressed as fol lows: ”changes in the sub jec tive level of anx i ety about
a lack of eco nomic safety are pro por tion ate to changes in ob jec tive risk”
(Osberg and Sharpe, 2002, p. 306). The cost of sick ness was es ti mated solely
as the share of un in sured pri vate med i cal care ex penses (which dis re gards
loss of earn ings due to time off work); the cost of loss of earn ings was cal cu -
lated from the gross re place ment rate for un em ployed work ers; and the cost 
of di vorce and old age from the mean pov erty rate for lone moth ers and
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3.  Some of these vari ables relate to legal fac tors (eli gi bil ity rules), some to insti tu tional ones
(required con trib u tory period, dura tion of guar an teed entitlements and wait ing time before
an income can be drawn), and oth ers are eco nomic (level of replace ment income and share of
ben efit costs funded by the individ ual) (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 47-48). The appen dix to
the book describ ing this index gives nei ther for mula nor cal cu la tion stages, so it is dif fi cult to
repro duce the decommodification index and impos si ble to cal cu late the val ues of each vari -
able.
older peo ple (pp. 306-308). These cal cu la tions have the ad van tage that they
pro duce re al is tic es ti mates of the scale of the in se cu ri ties as so ci ated with
four types of eco nomic risk. With ad di tional ap prox i ma tions,4 it is thus pos -
si ble to model the vari a tions in in di vid u als’ economic security, something
which could not be done with the use of Esping-Andersen’s decommodifi -
cation index.
But the as sess ments of in se cu rity ob tained in this way pro vide only very
par tial ap prox i ma tions of in come loss due to sick ness, un em ploy ment, di -
vorce or re tire ment. As a re sult, only vari a tions in in se cu rity over time can
be eval u ated in each coun try. So we can not com pare re spec tive lev els of
eco nomic se cu rity in dif fer ent coun tries of the West. Fur ther more, any ana -
lysis of in se cu rity is very prob lem atic be cause one can not val idly com pare
the risk from un em ploy ment to the risk caused by sick ness, di vorce or old
age. Once again, this other in di ca tor can not be used to simulate the pros and 
cons of variations in social policy.
Principles and conventions
underlying the ”decommodified security ratio“
Start ing from a di rectly eco nomic and global ap proach, our in ten tion was
to over come the lim i ta tions of ear lier in di ca tors in or der (1) to be able to
com pare the rel a tive per for mances of the var i ous so cial States in coun ter ing 
eco nomic in se cu rity in their pop u la tions, (2) to ana lyse the part played by
the dif fer ent risk fac tors, and (3) to simulate the ef fects of dif fer ent so cial
pol i cies on se cu rity. As pointed out by Gadrey and Jany-Catrice (2003, p. 73) 
at the end of an ar ti cle re view ing al ter na tive in di ces of de vel op ment and so -
cial prog ress, ”it is hard to see how one can do with out ‘ques tion able con -
ven tions’ when deal ing with the en vi ron ment, qual ity of life and so cial
progress, and thus with value sys tems. Even ‘se ri ous’ eco nomic in di ca tors
are full of ques tion able con ven tions, as wit ness the dis cus sion on the ma jor
un cer tain ties con cern ing com par i sons of per ca pita GDP in Eu rope.” Thus,
Esping-Andersen (1990) pre ferred an in sti tu tional ap proach in as sess ing
what he called ”the decommodifying po ten tial of so cial pol i cies”.5 We,
how ever, opted for a more individ ually based ap proach to peo ple’s se cu -
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4.  These approx i ma tions, which are not described at length in the arti cle in ques tion, sug gest
that the prob a bil ity of the total inse cu rity risk equals the sum of the prob a bil i ties of the four
risks taken into account. To accept this one must assume that the vari a tions in the par tial prob -
a bil i ties are addi tive (neg a tive for inse cu rity and pos i tive for secu rity) and there fore that
(1) their impor tance is mar ginal and (2) they are inde pend ent of each other.
5.  Namely ”the rules that gov ern peo ple’s access to ben efits: eli gi bil ity rules and restric tions
on entitlements”: p. 47.
rity, as sess ing lev els of means and, in par tic u lar, es ti mat ing the level at
which eco nomic in se cu rity be gins. It goes with out say ing that these two dif -
fer ent ap proaches pro duced two dif fer ent types of in di ca tors. The con ven -
tions we adopted (see Menahem and Cherilova, 2005) need to be de scribed
in de tail be cause they are ma te rial to our en tire ar gu ment. They are listed
be low and re flect three main prin ci ples.
Rel e vant means. We decided to esti mate, as means con trib ut ing to an eco n -
omic secu rity inde pend ent of links to an employer, decommodified income
which derives from social pro tec tion or pub lic assis tance schemes and
which peo ple receive at dif fer ent stages in their adult life. Infor ma tion of
this kind enables us to assess what pro por tion of individ uals do not have an
income ad equate to pro vide them with numer ous forms of secu rity which
are of prime impor tance, such as the abil ity to feed, house or clothe them -
selves. There are three types of such income:
• re place ment in come for the risks of old age, un em ploy ment, sick ness and 
dis abil ity plus sur vi vors’ pensions;
• re im burse ments and ben efits in kind: costs of healthcare, fam ily al low -
ances, hous ing ben efits;
• al low ances and ben efits in kind paid as part of mea sures to com bat so cial
ex clu sion (in come sup port, etc.).
Basis of comparison. For each coun try or ter ri tory we assessed the level of
means which con trib ute towards secu rity, mea sured against the mean dis -
pos able income of per sons in employ ment at the loca tion in ques tion. This
quint es sen tial prin ci ple is based on the hypoth e sis that per sons liv ing in a
ter ri tory mea sure their stan dard of liv ing against that of per sons deemed in
the insti tu tional and media ref er ence sys tem to be ”stan dard” individ uals,
namely those liv ing in the same social envi ron ment and with a job (we
approx i mate this ref er ence as the mean dis pos able income of per sons in
employ ment, spe cif i cally their income net of taxes and con tri bu tions, and
inclu sive of fam ily, hous ing and sick ness ben efits). The result ing ”gross
ratio of decommodified eco nomic secu ri ties” is the ratio of total decom mo -
dified income to the reference income for the territory in question.
Penalization of eco nomic inse cu rity. In order to take account of the first
type of eco nomic inse cu rity, that of per sons in pov erty due to insuf fi cient
income, we took the view that the eco nomic secu rity of house holds whose
per capita means are below the pov erty thresh old for the ter ri tory under
con sid er ation is zero and that their sit u a tion is penal ized by an inse cu rity
equal to the dif fer ence between their income and the ref er ence income.
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In prac tice, the index gives a neg a tive weight to peo ple below the pov erty
line by attrib ut ing to them a neg a tive income of 60 per cent of the mean dis -
pos able income of per sons in employ ment.6 This strong penal iza tion is de -
signed to take account of the posi tion of needy groups whose eco nomic
inse cu rity dimin ishes their chances of well-being and sur vival. It also raises
ques tions about the capac ity of the insti tu tions whose duty it is to pro vide
individ uals with a secu rity inde pend ent of mar ket vicis si tudes. Glob ally,
then, it has to be sub tracted from the decommodified secu rity provided by
the various institutions making up the social State.
This lat ter prin ci ple points up the im por tance we were anx ious to give to
the ob jec tive of so cial co he sion, in our view a ma jor fac tor in the se cu rity of a 
pop u la tion liv ing in a given ter ri tory. All in all, the decommodified (eco n -
omic) se cu rity ra tio (DSR) is both a sum mary and a rel a tive in di ca tor. Sum -
mary be cause it com bines a gross ra tio for the level of decommodified
means and the level of rel a tive pov erty. Rel a tive be cause it adds to gether
the in come from so cial entitlements which individ uals re ceive through out
their adult life in the coun try con cerned and di vides them by a de nom i na tor 
which rep re sents the av er age liv ing stan dard of per sons in em ploy ment,
less the rel a tive insecurity experienced by households below the poverty
line.
For mu lae for cal cu lat ing the DSR. These meth od olog i cal con sid er ations
all trans late into account ing for mu lae for cal cu lat ing and com par ing the
decommodified secu rity lev els of dif fer ent pop u la tions. They can be pre -
sented in two dif fer ently aggre gated forms. First, at a highly macro econ -
omic level, if DSR is the decommodified secu rity ratio and EII is the eco n -
omic inse cu rity index for per sons in house holds liv ing below the pov erty
thresh old, we have:
DSR =
 re place ment in comes + re im burse ments + ben efits and al low ances paid to com bat ex clu sion –EII        adult pop u la tion x mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment
where EII = 
pop u la tion in pov erty 
x
 60 per cent x mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment 
       adult pop u la tion     mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment
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6.  This assess ment of eco nomic inse cu rity is close to the pov erty thresh old, namely Eurostat’s
def i ni tion of ”60 per cent of the national median equivalized dis pos able income after social
trans fers”, hence the adop tion of this weight ing which pro vides a sys tem of penal iza tion con -
sis tent with the ref er ence income used in the denom i na tor. One notes also that the dis con ti nu -
ity of the curve for decommodified eco nomic secu rity as deter mined by peo ple’s incomes is
atten u ated by the exis tence of a sig nif i cant pro por tion of per sons whose income is close to the
pov erty line. Given that eco nomic secu rity is eval u ated in terms of the dif fer ence between their
income and 0.6 x the ref er ence income, the curve first drops to zero when income reaches the
pov erty thresh old, then falls slowly to its low est value, –0.6 x the ref er ence income, when
income decreases fur ther.
A sec ond for mula pro duced by a par tially disaggregated ap proach can
also be put for ward. The adult pop u la tion can be di vided into three cat -
egories ac cord ing to the type of decommodified in come which they re ceive:
individ uals who re ceive re place ment in comes (un em ploy ment or dis abil ity 
ben efit, re tire ment or sur vi vors’ pen sions); those who re ceive re im burse -
ments and ben efits in kind for their healthcare costs, or hous ing ben efits;
and those who re ceive ben efits and al low ances paid as part of mea sures to
com bat ex clu sion (so cial min ima such as in come sup port, ba sic old age pen -
sion and other forms of ”sol i dar ity” pay ment).
It is worth point ing out that there may be sig nif i cant over lap be tween the
four pop u la tions ar ti fi cially picked out here: for ex am ple, some un em -
ployed or re tired per sons cat e go rized as poor may be in re ceipt of a pen sion
or un em ploy ment ben efit while at the same time re ceiv ing re im burse ment
of healthcare costs or hous ing ben efits and, if their in come is too low to raise 
them out of the pov erty bracket, they may be pe nal ized in DSR terms be -
cause the last line of the for mula is neg a tive. Know ing that each pop u la tion
has to be weighted ac cord ing to its sta tis ti cal size and that we need to add to
these di rect decommodified in comes other in di rect in comes re ceived in re -
im burse ment of healthcare or other costs, we can also use a sec ond for mula,
as fol lows:7
DSR = % re tired, un em ployed, dis abled per sons x
  mean re place ment in come (pen sion, un em ploy ment)
                         mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment 
 
             +
 mean to tal of healthcare re im burse ments and in-kind and hous ing ben efits
                       mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment     
                            + % per sons suf fer ing pov erty and ex clu sion
             
x
 ben efits and al low ances paid to com bat ex clu sion and ba sic old age pen sion
             mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment       
 –0.6 x % pop u la tion in pov erty
To check how ac cu rately these the o ret i cal for mu lae can re cord the real
dif fer ences in se cu rity be tween coun tries, we used the da ta bases de vised
and main tained by Eurostat. In so do ing we took over the cat egories and
clas si fi ca tions drawn up by this Eu ro pean or ga ni za tion, par tic u larly re -
gard ing so cial ben efits, which Eurostat breaks down into eight groups un -
der its ESSPROS sys tem.
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7.  To switch from one for mula to the other, one merely needs to note that each total income
 figure is equal to the pop u la tion con cerned (i.e. per cent age in the adult pop u la tion x adult  po -
pulation) times the cor re spond ing mean income. For exam ple, for pen sion pay ments we get:
total pen sions = pen sion ers as a per cent age of adults x adult pop u la tion x mean pen sion per
pen sioner. Divid ing each of these terms by the denom i na tor sim pli fies the equa tion by remov -
ing the adult pop u la tion from numer a tor and denom i na tor, thus: per cent age of pen sion ers x
mean pen sion / mean dis pos able income of per sons in employ ment.
Features of decommodified security
in 20 European countries
Eurostat fig ures avail able in late Au gust 2006 al lowed us to cal cu late the
decommodified se cu rity ra tio in 20 coun tries of Eu rope for the year 2002.8
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Fig ure 1. Lev els of decommodified se cu rity in 20 Eu ro pean countries in 2002
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Source: Eurostat, data available in August 2006.
Note: The net DSR of 2.9 per cent for Lithuania is the difference between its low level of security-enhancing resources
(13.1 per cent) and its high economic insecurity (–10.2 per cent). In the United Kingdom, high insecurity (–10.8 per cent)
is offset by sizeable security-enhancing resources (23.9 per cent), so its DSR is 13.1 per cent, four times that of Lithuania.
8.  The great advan tage of Eurostat data is that they are pro vided within a con sis tent frame -
work which per mits inter na tional com par i sons. But being sup plied by the var i ous Euro pean
member state gov ern ments, they are only made avail able sub ject to spe cific rhythms and con -
straints. Con se quently our tabulation con tains the dif fer ent vari ables needed to cal cu late the
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Figure 2. The three main fac tors for eco nomic se cu rity and in se cu rity mak ing up
the decommodified se cu rity ra tio in 20 Eu ro pean coun tries in 2002
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Note: This fig ure shows the pos i tive and neg a tive fac tors which de ter mine decommodified se cu rity. Thus, in Spain
in 2002, the DSR is just 4.9 per cent of the mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment, i.e. the sum of se cu ri ties 
for re tire ment and un em ploy ment (9.2 per cent), sick ness and dis abil ity (6.4 per cent), ben efits to fam i lies and
dis ad van taged per sons (0.7 per cent), and less in se cu rity (11.4 per cent). By con trast, in Nor way it is 27.9 per cent
of the mean ref er ence in come, or five times higher in that same year (with, re spec tively, se cu ri ties of 10.2 per cent 
+ 17.9 per cent + 5.8 per cent, less insecurity of 6 per cent).
[8 cont.] DSR in years 1995-2002 for 20 coun tries only. This is seven coun tries more than in our
pre vi ous arti cle (Menahem and Cherilova, 2005) for years 1995-2000 using data from 2004. 
It should, more over, be noted that Eurostat relies on the eight-func tion ESSPROS clas si fi ca tion
of social ben efits devised and har mo nized for the NewCronos data base. Not with stand ing the
lim i ta tions of this clas si fi ca tion, it has the advan tage of allow ing us to com pare sys tems which
dif fer widely in the nature of their inher ent social entitlements, the con tent of the ben efits they
pro vide or the ori en ta tion of the pol i cies under ly ing them.
These es ti mates, re pro duced in Fig ure 1, re veal size able dif fer ences in the
se cu rity lev els of Eu ro pean pop u la tions, with four groups of coun tries
emerg ing as ho mo ge neous in terms of eco nomic guar an tees. The break -
down of sources of eco nomic se cu rity listed in Ta ble 1 and de picted graph i -
cally in Fig ure 2 gives us a better un der stand ing of the or i gins of these dis -
par i ties which can be traced back to the in sti tu tional his tory of these coun -
tries. Af ter a brief ac count of the lim i ta tions of our es ti mates we then set out
to ana lyse our con clu sions.
In terms of decommodified security,
European countries in four main groups
The wide di ver sity of out comes of Eu ro pean so cial ben efit sys tems is clearly 
ap par ent in Fig ure 1. A his tor i cal di vide can be seen be tween the coun tries
of the North, main land Eu rope plus the United King dom, whose so cial pro -
tec tion sys tems have made great strides in the past 50 years and more, and
the coun tries of the South and the cen tral and east ern Eu ro pean coun tries
(CEEC) where sys tems of pro tec tion are still ru di men tary or far more re -
cent. In the for mer main group, decommodified se cu rity ranges from 13 to
28 per cent of the mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment,
whereas in the sec ond group it is only 3 to 11 per cent. But the sec ond group
is far from ho mo ge neous and three quite dis tinct sub groups can be iden ti -
fied within it.
We would point out here that the typology used for the decommodified
se cu rity ra tio is largely com pat i ble with that of Esping-Andersen (1990).
The group of the coun tries of the North equates es sen tially to the group of
coun tries which Esping-Andersen calls ”so cial dem o cratic”, and the group
of coun tries la belled “in ter me di ate” is very close to his ”con ser va tive”
group, with two no ta ble ex cep tions out of ten coun tries: It aly is classed as
con ser va tive but is not in the “in ter me di ate” group, and the United King -
dom is part of the in ter me di ate group but is classed as ”lib eral”.9 Be cause
our es ti mates were for Eu ro pean coun tries only and Esping-Andersen did
not con sider other coun tries of the South or the CEEC, this com par i son
could not be taken fur ther.
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9.  In Esping-Andersen’s clas si fi ca tion (1990, p. 52), Italy has a decommodification index of
24.1, so the author places it in the ”con ser va tive” cat egory, ahead of the United King dom with
23.4, which he cat e go rizes as ”lib eral“. The DSR gives less weight to his tor i cal insti tu tional
vari ables and the total value of decommodified means is the sole objec tive cri te rion for clas si fi -
ca tion. This explains why the DSR for the United King dom is 13.1 per cent, well ahead of Italy’s 
(9.3 per cent), and that the United King dom is in the group of inter me di ate coun tries while Italy 
is in the coun tries of the South group (Menahem, 2006, p. 328).
Thus, the five ”coun tries of the North” with the high est DSR are part of
the same so cial dem o cratic tra di tion of ac tive state mea sures, gen er ous ben -
efits and uni ver sal cov er age, even if they did not re act to the cri sis of the
1990s with the same re forms.10 Their DSRs re flect the sim i lar i ties of their
type of so cial State: in 2002, be tween 22.2 and 27.9 per cent. The group of the
”in ter me di ate coun tries” is far more het er o ge neous, how ever, be cause it in -
cludes one ad vanced for mer so cial ist coun try (the Czech Re pub lic) and four 
coun tries which in Esping-Andersen’s clas si fi ca tion (1990) are ”con ser va -
tive” — Bel gium, Ger many, France and Aus tria — plus a ”lib eral” coun try,
the United King dom. The scat ter of their DSRs is some what greater, from
13.1 per cent for the United Kingdom to 22 per cent for Austria.
The group of the four ”coun tries of the South” ex hib its nu mer ous shared
fea tures. Here, poor de vel op ment of the so cial State has long gone hand in
hand with tra di tions of crony ism and corporatism, so pro duc ing vary ing
kinds of ob sta cles to re form. Thus, Greece, It aly, Spain and Por tu gal each in
their own way com bine the de vel op ment of their fi nan cial trans fers on a
corporatist ba sis with poorly de vel oped ben efits and ser vices to fam i lies
and those in pov erty, and the de vel op ment of fam ily net works to make up
for these in ad e qua cies.11 It is strik ing, over and above this va ri ety, that these 
four coun tries share a sim i larly low level of decommodified se cu rity: from
4.9 per cent for Spain to 11.1 per cent for Portugal.
Why is the dif fer ence in DSR be tween Spain and Por tu gal so large? This
may be ex plained in part by the dif fer ent ways in which the workforce is
mo bi lized in the two coun tries: first, the em ploy ment rate is far higher in
Por tu gal (49.3 per cent of the to tal pop u la tion in 2002) than it is in Spain
(39.4 per cent), while the Por tu guese so cial se cu rity sys tem has a greater
 capacity to col lect con tri bu tions and pro vide a high level of  decommodi -
fied ben efits. An other pe cu liar ity is that there are far more women in
 employment in Por tu gal (46 per cent of the work ing pop u la tion in 2002)
than in Spain (40 per cent). These facts dem on strate a greater com mit ment
by the so cial State to wards decommodified pro vi sion of care for chil dren
and the el derly pop u la tion in Portugal, where there are more working
women. 
The CEEC group also shows a ho mo ge ne ity born of his tory. The five so -
cial States con cerned all emerged from the same so cial ist sys tem, have all
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10.  Cf. the full account of the changes in the ”Scan di na vian wel fare state“ in the spe cial issue
of Revue française des affaires sociales pre sented by Strobel (2003), which repro duces the papers
given at a col lo quium orga nized by MiRe.
11.  Cf. the other set of writ ings from the ”Rencontres de Flor ence“ orga nized by MiRe under
the title ”Comparer les systèmes de pro tec tion sociale en Europe du Sud”, and the con clud ing
con tri bu tion writ ten by Rhodes and Palier (1997).
from dif fer ing dates on wards be gun the same pro cess of tran si tion to a mar -
ket econ omy and have joined the Eu ro pean Un ion. Al though their so cial se -
cu rity sys tems were shaped his tor i cally in a man ner spe cific to each of them
in di vid u ally, it is re mark able that their DSRs are sim i larly low, rang ing
from 2.9 per cent for Lith u a nia to 6.1 per cent for Po land. The low level of
DSRs in the CEEC prompts two ques tions: how is it so low when prior to
1989 the so cial ist re gimes in these coun tries pro vided the whole pop u la tion
with a min i mum level of se cu rity? And why is the DSR at least 11 per cent
higher in the Czech Re pub lic when that coun try has so many his tor i cal
char ac ter is tics in com mon with the other CEEC? First, it was only 15 years
ago at most that a start was made on trans fer ring the fi nanc ing of pen sions,
healthcare and the main so cial ben efits, pre vi ously done by the so cial ist
State in the CEEC, to a sys tem based on so cial se cu rity con tri bu tions. And
that is a pro cess re quir ing rad i cal re or ga ni za tion which will take a long
time. This pro cess of mak ing up ground has been made more dif fi cult by a
re sis tance to tax a tion en gen dered by higher con tri bu tions, which place a
bur den on em ploy ers and pri vate individ uals, and by the fact that em ploy -
ers now no lon ger pro vide a num ber of so cial ben efits. The Czech Re pub -
lic’s better DSR is due in the main to the greater growth in that coun try of
”health funds”, which fi nance the healthcare system on a decentralized
basis, and to more vigorous economic growth since 1994 resulting in better
reduction of poverty.
Links between the features of the
three main components of decommodified security,
and economic insecurity
The struc ture of the DSR is ana lysed nu mer i cally in Ta ble 1 and graph i cally
in Fig ure 2. This ana lysis leads us rap idly to four find ings: the first three
con cern decommodified means shown as pos i tive values above the hor i -
zon tal axis and vary ing from 13 to 34 per cent; and the last shows the lev els
of eco nomic in se cu rity as neg a tive val ues be low the hor i zon tal axis, from
5 to 13 per cent.
1. Replace ment incomes vary lit tle. These are retire ment pen sions, sur vi -
vors’ pen sions, unem ploy ment ben efit and jobseekers’ allow ances. Their
impor tance depends on his tor i cal tra di tion, the local eco nomic cli mate and
the abil ity of trade unions, employ ers and the State to nego ti ate social com -
pro mises. With the dif fi cul ties of set ting up new con trib u tory social secu -
rity sys tems, this explains why the level of these types of secu rity is still
quite low in the recently formed social fab ric of the cen tral and east ern
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Euro pean coun tries — at most 10 per cent, as in Poland and the Czech
Repub lic. In the coun tries with a long-estab lished corporatist tra di tion,
how ever, these decommodified secu ri ties are high, for exam ple in Aus tria
and the Neth er lands (15 per cent), in Swe den and Ger many (14 per cent), or
in France, Italy and Den mark (13 per cent). But at the same time these sim i -
lar lev els may con ceal dif fer ences, for exam ple between Dan ish motivation
and drive, and corporatist traditions in Italy.
2. Incomes from the reim burse ment of healthcare and dis abil ity expen di -
ture vary more. The tra di tions of the Scan di na vian coun tries whereby the
State funds the major ity of healthcare and pro vides gen er ous dis abil ity ben -
efits are very dif fer ent from the fra gil ity of the new sys tems being built in
the CEEC. The Nordic coun tries ear mark 11 to 18 per cent of their spend ing
for this while the CEEC spend only 4 to 8 per cent. Between these extremes,
the coun tries of the South, the United King dom and the coun tries of main -
land Europe oscil late between gen er os ity and reforms aimed at cutting the
costs of healthcare.
3. The great est vari abil ity is in ben efits to fam i lies and those in pov erty.
These ben efits total almost 8 per cent in Nor way as against less than 1 per
cent in Poland. In the coun tries of the South and the CEEC, where these
secu ri ties are no higher than 2.5 per cent, fam ily net works obvi ously make
up for inad e qua cies in state pro vi sion. But the secu ri ties cre ated in this way
are less cer tain as they depend on personal relations.
4. The results on poverty par tially reflect dif fer ing lev els of decommodified
means. In the coun tries of the North, where income guar an tees are less
depend ent on the labour mar ket and social pol i cies seek rather to cover peo -
ple by vir tue of their entitlements as cit i zens, groups with an income below
the pov erty thresh old are rel a tively small. Like wise, in the four ”inter me di -
ate” coun tries of main land Europe, state assis tance is rooted in more solid
tra di tions. Thus, there are lower lev els of eco nomic inse cu rity in these two
groups of coun tries: 6-7 per cent for the Neth er lands/Fin land, and 7-8 per
cent for France/Ger many. In the United King dom and Por tu gal, how ever,
where secu rity depends more on the labour mar ket, and social ben efits are
more of a safety net, penal iza tion for eco nomic inse cu rity is almost twice as
high: 11-12 per cent. It is also sig nif i cant (11-13 per cent) in the other coun -
tries of the South, where redis tri bu tion is still lim ited. In the central and
eastern Euro pean coun tries too, the size able reduc tion in pub lic ben efits
pro vided by the State, the increas ing num ber of unem ployed per sons no
lon ger cov ered by employ ers and the late emer gence of a mea gre social pro -
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tec tion ”safety net” are cre at ing high lev els of eco nomic inse cu rity of 10 to
13 per cent.12
Advantages and limitations of classifications based on
decommodified security
We find that the decommodified se cu rity ra tio has three prime ad van tages
when we com pare the anal y ses of so cial sys tems based on the DSR with
those us ing ei ther Esping-Andersen’s decommodificat ion in dex or the se -
cu rity com po nent of Osberg et Sharpe’s in dex of eco nomic well-be ing: (1) it
per mits com par i sons of the so cial sys tems of dif fer ent coun tries whose lev -
els of de vel op ment may be very un equal; (2) it helps to ana lyse the ex tent to
which var i ous so cial ben efits con trib ute to wards the eco nomic se cu rity of a
coun try’s na tion als, both one ben efit com pared with an other and all ben -
efits to gether; and (3) it en ables us to sim u late the ef fects of vari a tions in
eco nomic and so cial pol icy. But these prac ti cal ad van tages have to be
weighed against the DSR’s considerable limitations.
Ini tial un cer tain ties in the ta bles and fig ures re flect the in ad e qua cies of
the Eurostat data when it co mes to as sess ing decommodified in come.  Speci -
fically, the global na ture of the eight so cial pro tec tion func tions in the
ESSPROS clas si fi ca tion means that some cash ben efits or ben efits in kind as -
so ci ated with the func tions ”un em ploy ment”, ”sur vi vors” and ”old age”
are cat e go rized as re place ment in come and not as ben efits. More over, the
Eurostat clas si fi ca tion ag gre gates all in come which goes into the for ma tion
of re tire ment pen sions, re gard less of whether the schemes con cerned are
pay-as-you-go or funded schemes, and this in tro duces a mea sure of fuzz i -
ness into intercountry com par i sons of decommodified in come. The global
na ture of the ”sick ness” and ”dis abil ity” func tions in the ESSPROS clas si fi -
ca tion also means that this cat egory in cludes re place ment in come cor re -
spond ing to dis abil ity pen sions and the per diem ben efits paid for time off
work due to sick ness. This further reduces the accuracy of our breakdowns.
In ad di tion to these fac tors, the ul ti mate im pact of which is yet to be as -
sessed, there are other lim i ta tions which re sult from struc tural dif fer ences in
the break down of em ploy ment, re flect ing so ci etal choices in the dif fer ent coun -
tries: dif fer ences be tween gen er a tions (young peo ple start ing work rel a -
tively late, older peo ple stop ping work rel a tively early), dif fer ences be -
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12.  It is sig nif i cant that the coun try clas si fi ca tion by Corak (2006) based on child low-income
rates in the early years of the new mil len nium, using data col lected for the OECD by Mira
d’Ercole and Förster (2005), ech oes the clas si fi ca tion based on the DSR: only Greece, Poland
and Spain do better when clas si fied accord ing to child income rather than accord ing to the
DSR.
tween men and women and be tween part- and full-time work ing. These
three cri te ria are largely in ter de pen dent and sig nif i cantly af fect mean in -
come in a coun try be cause of dif fer ences in pay be tween men and women,
young and older peo ple, full- and part-time work ers. For ex am ple, the
higher pro por tion of women and older peo ple in em ploy ment in Por tu gal,
the United King dom and the coun tries of the North is re flected in two fac -
tors which pro duce a higher level of eco nomic se cu rity in these coun tries: a
higher over all em ploy ment rate, which means higher to tal con tri bu tions,
and lower mean lev els of pay, which means a lower DSR de nom i na tor.13
More part-time work ing in the Neth er lands, the coun tries of the North and
the United King dom has a sim i lar ef fect and helps to push up the figures for
economic security in these countries.
In the coun tries of the South such as It aly, Spain and Greece and in the
central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries, more over, a very sig nif i cant phe -
nom e non is that of the pro por tion of un de clared il le gal work ing. This is a size -
able phe nom e non in France too, lead ing to con sid er able un cer tainty about
the pro por tion of the pop u la tion ac tu ally in work. This fuzz i ness causes
vary ing un der es ti mates of the DSR which are hard to as sess, but it is rea son -
able to sup pose that se cu rity will more likely be un der es ti mated in the
coun tries of the South than the North.
Un equal rates of main res i dence own er ship, more un equal in the South of Eu -
rope than in the United King dom or the coun tries of the North, re late to
older peo ple more than to youn ger house holds. These rates thus cause the
in comes and ben efits paid to per sons not in work to be un der es ti mated to a
greater de gree in the South than in the North, which helps to re duce the
DSR more in the South than in the North. Fur ther more, it ought to be pos si -
ble, in more ex ten sive as sess ments of eco nomic in se cu rity, to take ac count
of the eco nomic in se cu ri ties as so ci ated with rented ac com mo da tion, tem po -
rary hous ing or home less ness.
More fun da men tally, in de fin ing the DSR, the con ven tions used to es tab -
lish the na ture of the ref er ence in come against which the var i ous decom -
modified means and eco nomic in se cu rity are mea sured are ex tremely im -
por tant. They have been par tially jus ti fied above. But they re main ar bi trary
and many al ter na tives could use fully be tested: mean in come for all house -
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13.  From this point of view it would be inter est ing to assess mean income lev els for  compar -
able age, gen der and work ing time struc tures, some thing that would enable us to mea sure how 
far these soci etal choices influ ence the rel a tive clas si fi ca tion of decommodified secu rity lev els.   
Like wise, cal cu la tions of per capita GDP would shift mark edly as a result. Because the cal cu la -
tion of GDP vol ume is con stant, this just means in effect that the level of rel a tive prices would
be changed by an oper a tion of this kind, reflect ing the link that exists between soci etal choices
and both labour pro duc tiv ity and the meth ods of income dis tri bu tion in each coun try.
holds, or me dian in come, ei ther in con fin ing one self to the em ploy ment
com po nent, as in our cal cu la tions, or in con sid er ing all forms of in come.14
The  sim ulations de scribed be low dem on strate the im pli ca tions of these
choices.
Main results of DSR simulations
for 20 European countries in 2002
Social pol icy ac tors might ask them selves what the ef fects would be on peo -
ple’s se cu rity of in creas ing re tire ment or un em ploy ment ben efits or spend -
ing on the re im burse ment of healthcare costs. They might also wish to com -
pare the re sults of this spend ing on se cu rity with the re sult ob tained if in -
comes are in creased by a spec i fied pay rise to em ploy ees. We sought an -
swers to these ques tions by per form ing ten sim u la tions of the fac tors which
de ter mine the DSR.
Method used
In or der to as sess the sen si tiv ity of the DSR to vari a tions in so cial ben efits or
pri vate in di vid u als’ in comes, we sim u lated a range of al ter na tive so cial pol -
icy sce nar ios. We took as our ref er ence sit u a tion the po si tion of the 20 Eu ro -
pean coun tries in 2002, as por trayed in the Eurostat fig ures. By vary ing just
one of the ten pa ram e ters mea sured by 1 per cent from the 2002 val ues, it is
pos si ble to cal cu late the elas tic i ties15 of eco nomic se cu rity in re sponse to
vari a tions in the ten fac tors (seven dif fer ent so cial ben efits and three types
of in come). It should be re mem bered here that in come from paid em ploy -
ment, self-em ploy ment and prop erty con sti tutes the three main com po -
nents of the dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment, and this ref er -
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14.  There is not room in this arti cle to explore the var i ous tests which might rem edy these inad -
e qua cies. These could be cov ered in a future pub li ca tion.
15.  Elas tic ity is the mea sure of a given object’s sen si tiv ity to a force or pres sure. In eco nom ics
we talk of the elas tic ity of demand for a good or ser vice depend ing on a range of fac tors
(income lev els, prices, etc.). We cal cu late elas tic ity by deter min ing the rela tion ship between
rel a tive vari a tions in the vari able under con sid er ation and those in the fac tor we wish to study.
To deter mine the elas tic ity of eco nomic secu rity in rela tion to pen sion amount, the for mula is:
elas tic ity of eco nomic secu rity = rel a tive vari a tion in eco nomic secu rity / rel a tive vari a tion
in pen sion amount. For exam ple, all other things being equal, if a 1 per cent wage increase in
Poland pro duces a 1.2 per cent drop in secu rity, the elas tic ity of secu rity in rela tion to income
is –1.2. In this case, the per cent age drop in secu rity is greater than the per cent age income
increase, and secu rity is deemed to be ”income-elas tic”. But if a 1 per cent increase in fam ily
ben efits pro duces a smaller per cent age increase in secu rity (+0.12 per cent), the elas tic ity of
secu rity in rela tion to fam ily ben efits (0.12) is less than unit; secu rity is thus deemed ”inelas tic“
in respect of this ben efit.
ence forms the de nom i na tor against which decommodified means are es ti -
mated.16
Vari a tions in the elas tic ity of se cu rity are the re sponse to two dis tinct ef -
fects: one, the di rect ef fect of ben efit sup ple ments which in creases the nu -
mer a tor; and two, the in di rect ef fect caused by al ter ing the ref er ence level
against which se cu rity is mea sured, which changes both the de nom i na tor
and the es ti mated eco nomic in se cu rity level of per sons liv ing be low the
pov erty thresh old. Com par i son of these two ef fects will help us to un der -
stand the vari a tions in the DSR which our so cial pol icy sim u la tions pro -
duce.
Analysis of the simulation results
Two gen eral find ings emerge from an ana lysis of the re sults in Ta ble 2. The
ta ble’s ten col umns show the elas tic i ties of the decommodified se cu rity ra -
tios cal cu lated for a 1 per cent vari a tion in each of the seven main so cial ben -
efits and each of the three main types of di rect in come, each fac tor be ing as -
sumed to vary on its own and with out al ter ing the em ploy ment rate. The
20 Eu ro pean coun tries are ranked in de scend ing or der of their DSR (the
2002 fig ures are given in the sec ond col umn from the left).
Se cu rity gains rise as the DSR falls. Gen er ally speak ing, se cu rity gains mea -
sured by elas tic i ties are seen to be greater, the lower the ini tial level of the
DSR. This phe nom e non is hugely im por tant bear ing in mind the so cial co -
he sion ob jec tives of the Lis bon strat egy adopted by the Eu ro pean Un ion in
2000. We can ver ify it for decommodified ben efits paid only to per sons not
in em ploy ment (the ef fects of which op er ate only through changes in the
nu mer a tor), for uni ver sal ben efits paid re gard less of whether peo ple are in
em ploy ment or not, and for the var i ous forms of commodified in come (the
ef fects of which op er ate es sen tially through changes in the denominator).
Vari a tions in elas tic ity are gov erned by three dis tinct mech a nisms. The col -
umns in Ta ble 2 are ar ranged from left to right in de creas ing or der of in de -
pend ence from the mar ket, from pen sions and un em ploy ment ben efits (the
ben efits which are the most in de pend ent of em ploy ment in come), through
to in come from oc cu pa tional ac tiv ity and prop erty. We shall ob serve this
or der in ana lys ing the re spec tive parts which di rect and in di rect fac tors
play in vari a tions in eco nomic se cu rity, and we shall see that these fac tors
obey three dif fer ent ra tio nales.
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16.  In order to take account of the vari a tions in secu rity cre ated by the tax bur den from tax able
income sup ple ments, we endogenized the total amount of tax pay able by assum ing the tax rate 
to be con stant and equal to that of the ref er ence sit u a tion in the coun try in ques tion in 2002.
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1. Ben efits paid only to per sons not in employ ment. Increases in these
benefits, which are tar geted at per sons who are not work ing (unem ploy ment
and old age), have the great est secu rity-enhanc ing effect, all the more so
when these ben efits are expand ing in a coun try where social cov er age is gen -
er ally low (coun tries of the South and the cen tral and east ern Euro pean coun -
tries: cf. last 9 rows of Table 2). Unem ploy ment and old age ben efits are in fact 
decommodified ben efits par excel lence in that they are paid only to per sons
who are no lon ger part of the workforce and they have no direct impact on
the income of per sons in employ ment. Thus, their con tri bu tion to the DSR
var ies only with increases in income as rep re sented in the numer a tor.
Ben efits paid as part of mea sures to com bat ex clu sion (col umn 3) con trib -
ute to the DSR in the same way, be ing paid only to per sons not in em ploy -
ment; so they only have an ef fect through the DSR nu mer a tor. Once again,
these are more im por tant in Slovakia and Lith u a nia, coun tries where these
ben efits are as yet poorly de vel oped, though the fig ures are lower than for
pen sions or un em ploy ment ben efits. Note too that the se cu rity-en hanc ing
role of an iden ti cal in crease in ben efits is weighted by the stan dard of liv ing: 
the lower this is, the more an iden ti cal in crease in in come sup port, for ex am -
ple, will trans late into a greater in crease in se cu rity, and thus into greater
elasticity.
To il lus trate these cal cu la tions we have en vis aged ex am ples which are
plau si ble un der cur rent so cial con di tions: 2 per cent growth in re tire ment
pen sions or 2 per cent growth in un em ploy ment ben efit. In Po land, for ex -
am ple, a 2 per cent in crease in pen sions in 2002 would mean a 2.7 per cent
in crease in the DSR. Whereas in Den mark, where the stan dard of liv ing and
pen sion lev els are much higher, this same in crease would raise the level of
decommodified se cu rity by only 0.8 per cent. If un em ploy ment-re lated
pub lic spend ing, al ready high in Den mark (one quar ter of pen sion spend -
ing), were to in crease by 2 per cent, the DSR would rise by only 0.18 per cent
(again, a quar ter). But in Po land, the en hance ment of decommodified se cu -
rity brought about by this same in crease would be only 0.23 per cent, be -
cause un em ploy ment ben efits make up a far smaller pro por tion of to tal so -
cial benefits in that country.
2. Ben efits paid regard less of employ ment sta tus. Sick ness and dis abil ity
ben efits (col umns 6 and 7) are uni ver sal ben efits paid both to per sons who
are work ing and those out side the labour mar ket. In coun tries where such
ben efits are vir tu ally non-exis tent (coun tries of the South and the central
and eastern Euro pean coun tries), their secu rity-enhanc ing effect (DSR) is
very con sid er able. It is, how ever, less sig nif i cant than that of ben efits paid
only to unem ployed per sons. The influ ence of uni ver sal ben efits is dimin -
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ished by the fact that they help to increase the ref er ence income of those in
employ ment, the level of which affects both the DSR denom i na tor and the
esti mate of eco nomic insecurity.
Fam ily and hous ing ben efits (col umns 4 and 5) are paid both to per sons
who are work ing and those who are out side the la bour mar ket, but they are
of ten means-tested. The ef fect on the DSR of any in crease in these is thus
more lim ited be cause the in crease in their con tri bu tion to the nu mer a tor is
smaller and is, more over, par tially off set by the fact that these ben efits are
added to the in comes of those in em ploy ment, which in creases the ref er ence 
in come and thus the de nom i na tor too. Be cause these ben efits are cur rently
very lim ited in the coun tries of the South and the CEEC, their con tri bu tion
to the DSR in these coun tries is greater.
3. Incomes from eco nomic activ ity and prop erty. Sup ple ments to wages
and sal a ries, how ever, assum ing a con stant num ber of per sons employed
and a ris ing stan dard of liv ing for eco nom i cally active per sons, trans late
into a reduc tion in decommodified secu rity (DSR). Why is this? Because
these increases entail a rise in the ref er ence income, which enables us to
mea sure both eco nomic inse cu rity and the decommodified secu rity cre ated
by ben efits. When the stan dard of liv ing rises, the decommodified secu rity
cre ated by a cer tain level of ben efits rel a tive to the ref er ence income falls.
Table 2 shows that the lower the denom i na tors con cerned are, the more this
secu rity decreases: and it decreases more in the coun tries of the East or the
South than in Scan di na via. A sec ond major effect depends on the numer a -
tor: this is the increase in eco nomic inse cu rity which penal izes decommo -
dified secu rity in pro por tion to the pov erty rate and ref er ence income.
These two fac tors ac count for the neg a tive elas tic i ties for in come from
eco nomic ac tiv ity and prop erty (Ta ble 2, last 3 col umns on the right). In -
come from prop erty (col umn 10) is shared be tween per sons who are eco -
nom i cally ac tive and those who are not, and it thus has less of an ef fect on
the ref er ence in come; this ex plains why these elas tic i ties are lower than
those for self-em ployed in come, though the in comes are com pa ra ble.
In come from paid em ploy ment (col umn 8) ac counts for the larg est share
of the ref er ence in come, which is why the elas tic i ties for this are al ways the
great est. There is one ex cep tion, Greece, where the pro por tion of in for mal
work is very high and re corded in comes from self-em ploy ment ex ceed
those from paid em ploy ment. The far smaller elas tic i ties of the northern
coun tries com pared with those of the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun -
tries, the coun tries of the South or the United King dom are ex plained both
by higher in come lev els in those coun tries, which raise the ref er ence stan -
dard of liv ing ac cord ingly, and by their lower pov erty rate. Com pared with
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the level for Nor way (–0.70), the stron ger pe nal iza tion of the United King -
dom (–1.16) can be ex plained largely by this sec ond fac tor, while that of
Spain (–2.00) or Es to nia (–2.65) is due to a com bi na tion of the two.
Three rationales determine the sensitivity
of security to variations in its components
Three dif fer ent ra tio nales emerge when we com pare the sen si tiv i ties of
decommodified se cu rity to the dif fer ent ben efits and in come sources which
de ter mine it. The fea tures of the three ra tio nales for these com po nents are
 illustrated in Ta ble 3, which pro vides a syn op sis of mul ti ple data.17 It is  no -
table that the elas tic ity ra tio takes just three val ues for each coun try: a max i -
mum score of 1, for the three ben efits paid only to per sons not in em ploy -
ment (col umns 1, 2, 3) and whose di rect ef fects are not at ten u ated be cause
they do not in flu ence the in come of eco nom i cally ac tive per sons; a score of
less than 1 for the four uni ver sal ben efits (col umns 4-7), the ef fect of which
on se cu rity is at ten u ated by the fact that they push up the ref er ence in come,
both through in se cu rity and the de nom i na tor; and a co ef fi cient greater than
1 for the three in comes which do not con trib ute to decommodified se cu rity
(col umns 8, 9, 10), though in creases in them nev er the less help to lessen the
re duc tion which goes with eco nomic in se cu rity (in pro por tion to the in -
come of per sons in em ploy ment) ow ing to di vi sion by the de nom i na tor, all
things which help to re duce the DSR.18
The dif fer ences be tween the decommodified se cu rity scores of the var i -
ous ben efits sug gest that pol i cies di rectly tar geted at per sons not in em ploy -
ment con trib ute the most to wards en hanc ing peo ple’s se cu rity. This find ing 
is truer of the coun tries of the North and the in ter me di ate coun tries, as we
see from Ta ble 3, which shows that the score for uni ver sal ben efits rises as
the DSR falls. In the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries, the score of
more than 93 per cent for all ben efits shows that all so cial pol i cies con trib ute 
more or less equally to in creas ing peo ple’s se cu rity and im prov ing so cial
co he sion, in line with the rec om men da tions of the Lisbon strategy. 
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17.  To cal cu late the score for ben efits and sen si tiv ity to incomes, we sim ply cal cu late the elas -
tic ity ratio of the DSR and the elas tic ity ratio of the DSR numer a tor, for the ten com po nents
of the secu rity-enhanc ing resources. This oper a tion mea sures the total effects of ben efits on
decommodified secu rity (both direct and indi rect effects on the ref er ence income against
which secu rity and inse cu rity are mea sured) as against the effect on the numer a tor alone. The
cal cu la tion stages con cern three terms: the elas tic i ties of decommodified secu rity (Table 2) and
the elas tic i ties of the DSR numer a tors and denom i na tors (repro duced in the annex, Tables 4
and 5).
18.  This coef fi cient can not be inter preted as a score, because it assesses the indi rect effect on
decommodified secu rity of increases in incomes which are not secu rity-enhanc ing resources.
In ad di tion to dif fer ences be tween coun tries, the con trasts be tween these
three ra tio nales point to the im por tance of changes in the ref er ence in comes
against which peo ple rate the ben efits they re ceive. The se cu rity gains pro -
vided by a given amount of ben efits are all the greater if they re late to mea s -
ures as so ci ated with a more mod est rise in the gen eral level of in comes.
Conclusions
A re view of the ways in which decommodified se cu rity is taken into ac -
count in the coun tries of Eu rope shows us that this di men sion is of sig nif i -
cant value to so cial States and can be iden ti fied dif fer ently in four groups of
coun tries. Decommodified se cu rity is es pe cially de vel oped in the so cial
dem o cratic coun tries of the North, where so cial se cu rity achieve ments have 
be come more of an es tab lished part of the in sti tu tional fab ric in a man ner
largely in de pend ent of the la bour mar ket. This makes the term ”decom -
modified“, as ap plied to these forms of se cu rity, all the more ap pro pri ate.
An other no ta ble find ing: so cial pol i cies more founded on decommodified
se cu rity in the North mean that peo ple are better in te grated by vir tue of
their entitlements as cit i zens, and this trans lates into pov erty rates which
are lower by half. In the United King dom and Por tu gal, how ever, where se -
cu rity is more ”commodified” in the sense that it is more de pend ent on the
la bour mar ket, the pro por tion of per sons in pov erty is twice as high as in the 
coun tries with a so cial dem o cratic tra di tion. Nev er the less, it ap pears that
a so cial tra di tion per sists in the old-es tab lished so cial State of the United
King dom, where the im por tance of so cial in comes in her ited from the Bever -
idge Plan keeps the decommodified se cu rity ra tio well above that of It aly.
Lastly, we found that the level of decommodified se cu rity in the central and
eastern Eu ro pean coun tries is low. All the more rea son to at tach im por tance 
to tak ing the se cu rity di men sion into ac count when defining the social
protection systems which these countries are preparing to develop.
In that con text it may be use ful to draw on our so cial pol icy sim u la tions.
These led us to iden tify two types of ben efits: those aimed at per sons not in
em ploy ment, and uni ver sal ben efits whose less tar geted ef fects do less to
in crease the level of decommodified se cu rity. These two types of ben efits
fur ther the con ver gence of so cial sys tems more when they are dis trib uted in 
the coun tries of the South and the central and eastern Eu ro pean coun tries,
whose sys tems are sig nif i cantly less de vel oped than in the so cial States of
northern Eu rope. The greater score for ben efits aimed at peo ple not in em -
ploy ment, par tic u larly ben efits paid to com bat ex clu sion, thus sug gests
which pol i cies would be most likely to im prove so cial co he sion, in line with
the ob jec tives of the Lisbon strategy.
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Our sim u la tions also al lowed us to dem on strate the im por tance of the
links be tween re dis tri bu tion pol i cies and their in di rect ef fects in de ter min -
ing ref er ence in comes against which peo ple mea sure their stan dard of liv -
ing. They also re vealed the com plex re la tion ships be tween pov erty rates,
per ceived lev els of in se cu rity and the break down of the pop u la tion into
per sons in paid em ploy ment and self-em ploy ment and those not in em -
ploy ment. As trade and the means of pro duc tion be come more and more
glob al ized, the deep en ing com plex ity of these re la tion ships may be an in -
creas ingly topical issue.
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Annex
Stages in calculation of the DSR
and the score for benefit-derived security
The DSR is an in dex which cal cu lates a nu mer a tor, the sum of decom mo dified
se cu rity-en hanc ing re sources less eco nomic in se cu rity, rel a tive to a de nom i na -
tor, the mean dis pos able in come of per sons in em ploy ment. It is thus dou bly
use ful to know the elas tic i ties of the nu mer a tor (Ta ble 4) and the de nom i na tor
(Ta ble 5).
This knowl edge en ables us first to un der stand the struc tural logic of DSR
elas tic ity. Be cause the elas tic ity of a ra tio is equal to the dif fer ence be tween the
elas tic ity of the nu mer a tor and that of the de nom i na tor, each cell in Ta ble 2 can
be de duced log i cally from the dif fer ence be tween the equiv a lent cells in Ta -
bles 4 and 5. In Nor way, for ex am ple, the elas tic ity of decom modified se cu rity
in re la tion to to tal sick ness ben efits (col umn 8) is 0.28 ac cord ing to Ta ble 2.
When we see from Ta bles 4 and 5 that this fig ure is equal to the dif fer ence be -
tween the elas tic ity of the nu mer a tor (0.40) and that of the de nom i na tor (0.12),
we un der stand better the rea sons for the dif fer ence be tween the elas tic ity fig -
ures for Nor way and for Lith u a nia (1.20, or the dif fer ence be tween 1.24 and
0.04), which is at trib ut able to the very poor de vel op ment of sick ness ben efits in
the lat ter coun try.
Know ing the elas tic ity of the nu mer a tor (Ta ble 4) then en ables us, by mea s -
ur ing it against the elas tic ity of the DSR (Ta ble 2), to as sess its rel a tive con tri bu -
tion, and thus the score for the var i ous ben efits19 in each coun try (Ta ble 3). Thus, 
again in the case of Nor way, Ta ble 3 shows us that the score for sick ness ben efits 
(0.70 in col umn 8) is equal to the ra tio be tween the elas tic ity in Ta ble 2 (0.28) and 
that in Ta ble 4 (0.70), which ex plains why it is lower than in Lith u a nia (where
the score is 0.97, or 1.20/1.24).
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19.  This is more accu rately the score for ben efits net of their con tri bu tion to the increase in
 economic inse cu rity, which is taken into account in the numer a tor. We also cal cu lated the gross 
scores for the var i ous ben efits and will be happy to make these avail able on request. The main
thing to know is that they too are con stant for all uni ver sal ben efits and equal to 1 in the case of
ben efits for per sons not in employ ment. 
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